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Abstract—Protecting vast quantities of data poses a
daunting challenge for the growing number of organiza-
tions that collect, stockpile, and monetize it. The ability to
distinguish data that is actually needed from data collected
“just in case” would help these organizations to limit the
latter’s exposure to attack. A natural approach might be to
monitor data use and retain only the working-set of in-use
data in accessible storage; unused data can be evicted to a
highly protected store. However, many of today’s big data
applications rely on machine learning (ML) workloads that
are periodically retrained by accessing, and thus exposing
to attack, the entire data store. Training set minimization
methods, such as count featurization, are often used to
limit the data needed to train ML workloads to improve
performance or scalability.
We present Pyramid, a limited-exposure data man-
agement system that builds upon count featurization to
enhance data protection. As such, Pyramid uniquely in-
troduces both the idea and proof-of-concept for leveraging
training set minimization methods to instill rigor and selec-
tivity into big data management. We integrated Pyramid
into Spark Velox, a framework for ML-based targeting
and personalization. We evaluate it on three applications
and show that Pyramid approaches state-of-the-art models
while training on less than 1% of the raw data.
I. Introduction
Driven by cheap storage and the immense perceived
potential of “big data,” both public and private sectors
are accumulating vast quantities of personal data: clicks,
locations, visited websites, social interactions, and more.
Data offers unique opportunities to improve personal
and business effectiveness. It can boost applications’
utility by personalizing their features; increase business
revenues via targeted product placement; improve social
processes such as healthcare, disaster response and crime
prevention. Its commercialization potential, whether real
or perceived, drives unprecedented efforts to grab and
store raw data resources that can later be mined for profit.
Unfortunately, this “collect-everything” mentality
poses serious risks for organizations by exposing ex-
tensive data stores to external and internal attacks. The
hacking and exploiting of sensitive corporate and govern-
mental information have become commonplace [1], [2].
Privacy-transgressing employees have been discovered
snooping into data stores to spy on friends, family, and
job candidates [3], [4]. Although organizations strive
to restrict access to particularly sensitive data (such
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as passwords, SSNs, emails, banking data), properly
managing access controls for diverse and potentially
sensitive information remains an unanswered problem.
Compounding this challenge is a significant new
thrust in the public and private spheres to integrate
data collected from multiple sources into a single, giant
repository (or “data lake”) and make that available to any
applications that might benefit from it [5]–[7]. This prac-
tice magnifies the data exposure problem, transforming
big data into what some have called a “toxic asset” [8].
Our goal in this paper is to explore a more rigorous
and selective approach to big data protection. We hypoth-
esize that not all data that is collected and archived is, or
may ever be, needed or used. The ability to distinguish
data needed now or in the future from data collected “just
in case” could enable organizations to restrict the latter’s
exposure to attacks. For example, one could ship unused
data to a tightly controlled store, whose read accesses are
carefully mediated and audited. Turning this hypothesis
into a reality requires finding ways to: (1) minimize data
kept in the company’s widely-accessible data lakes, and
(2) avoid the need to access the controlled store to meet
current and evolving workload needs.
A natural approach might be to monitor data use and
retain only the working set of in-use data in accessible
storage; data unused for some time is evicted to the
protected store [9]. However, many of today’s big data
applications involve machine learning (ML) workloads
that are periodically retrained to incorporate new data,
resulting in frequent accesses to all data. How can we
determine and minimize the training set—the “working
set” for emerging ML workloads—to adopt a more
rigorous and selective approach to big data protection?
We observe that for ML workloads, significant re-
search is devoted to limiting the amount of data required
for training. The reasons are many but typically do not
involve data protection. Rather, they include increasing
performance, dealing with sparsity, and limiting labeling
effort. Techniques such as dimensionality reduction [10],
feature hashing [11], vector quantization [12], and count
featurization [13] are routinely applied in practice to
reduce data dimensionality so models can be trained
on manageable training sets. Semi-supervised [14] and
active learning [15] reduce the amount of labeled data
needed for training when labeling requires manual effort.
Can such mechanisms also be used to limit exposure
of the data being collected? How can an organization
that already uses these methods develop a more robust
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data protection architecture around them? What kinds of
protection guarantees can this architecture provide?
As a first step to answering these questions, we present
Pyramid, a limited-exposure big-data management sys-
tem built around a specific training set minimization
method called count featurization [13], [16]–[18]. Also
called historical statistics, count featurization is a widely
used technique for reducing training times by feeding
ML algorithms with a limited subset of the collected data
combined (or featurized) with historical aggregates from
much larger amounts of data. The method is valuable
when features with strong predictive power are highly
dimensional, requiring large quantities of data (and large
amounts of time and resources) to be properly modeled.
Applications that use count featurization include targeted
advertising, recommender systems, and content personal-
ization systems. Such applications rely on user informa-
tion to predict clicks, but since there can be hundreds of
millions of users, training can be very expensive without
some way to aggregate users, like count featurization.
The advertising systems at Microsoft, Facebook, and
Yahoo are all built upon this mechanism [19], and
Microsoft Azure offers it as a service [20].
Pyramid builds on count featurization to construct
a selective data protection architecture that minimizes
exposure of individual observations (e.g., individual
clicks). To highlight, Pyramid: keeps a small, rolling
window of accessible raw data (the hot window); sum-
marizes the history with privacy-preserving aggregates
(called counts); trains application models with hot raw
data featurized with counts; and rolls over the counts to
forget all traces of observations past a specified retention
period. Counts are infused with differentially private
noise [21] to protect individual observations that are no
longer in the hot window but still fall within the retention
period. Counts can support modifications and additions
of many (but not all) types of models; historical raw data,
which may be needed for workloads not supported by
count featurization, is kept in an encrypted store whose
decryption requires special access.
While count featurization is not new, our paper is the
first to retrofit it for data protection. Doing so raises
significant challenges. We first need to define meaning-
ful requirements and protection guarantees that can be
achieved with this mechanism, such as the amount of
exposed information or the granularity of protection. We
then need to achieve these protection guarantees without
affecting model accuracy and scalability, despite using
much less raw data. Finally, to make the historical raw
data store easier to protect, we need to access it as little
as possible. This means supporting workload evolution,
such as parameter tuning or trying new algorithms,
without the need to go back to historical raw data store.
We overcome these challenges with three main tech-
niques: (1) weighted noise infusion, which automatically
shares the privacy budget to give noise-sensitive fea-
tures less noise; (2) an unbiased private count-median
sketch, a data structure akin to a count-min sketch that
resolves the large negative bias arising from applying
differentially private noise to a count-min sketch; and
(3) automatic count selection, which detects potentially
useful groups of features to count together, to avoid
accesses to the historical data. Together, these techniques
reduce the impact of differentially private noise and
count featurization.
We built Pyramid and integrated it into Spark Velox,
a targeting and personalization framework, to add rigor
and selectivity to its data management. We evaluated
three applications: a targeted advertising system using
the Criteo dataset, a movie recommender using the
MovieLens dataset, and MSN’s production news per-
sonalization system. Results show that: (1) Pyramid
approaches state-of-the-art models while training on less
than 1% of the raw data. (2) Protecting historical counts
with differential privacy has only 2% impact on accu-
racy. (3) Pyramid adds just 5% performance overhead.
Overall, we make the following contributions:
1) Formulating the selective data protection problem
for emerging ML workloads as a training set min-
imization problem, for which many mechanisms
already exist.
2) The design of Pyramid, the first selective data
management system that minimizes data exposure
in anticipation of attack. Built upon count featur-
ization, Pyramid is particularly suited for targeting
and personalization workloads.
3) A set of new techniques to balance solid protection
guarantees with model accuracy and scalability,
such as our unbiased private count-median sketches.
4) Pyramid’s code, both integrated into Spark
Velox and as a stand-alone library ready
to integrate in other targeting/personalization
frameworks. https://columbia.github.
io/selective-data-systems/
II. Motivation and Goals
This paper argues for needs-based selectivity in big
data protection: protecting data differently depending
on whether or not it is actually needed to handle a
company’s day-to-day workloads. Intuitively, data that is
needed day-to-day is less amenable to certain kinds of
protection (e.g., auditing or case-by-case access control)
than data needed only for exceptional situations. A key
question is whether a company’s day-to-day needs can
be captured with a limited and well-defined data subset.
While we do not claim to answer this question in full, we
present with Pyramid the first evidence that selectivity
can be achieved in one important big-data workload
domain: ML-based targeting and personalization. The
following scenario motivates selectivity and shows how
and in what contexts Pyramid helps improve protection.
II.A. Example Use Case
MediaCo, a media conglomerate, collects observations
of user behavior from its hundreds of affiliate news
and entertainment sites. Observations include the articles
users read and share, the ads they click, and how they re-
spond to A/B testing. MediaCo uses this data to optimize
various processes, including recommending articles to
users, showing the most relevant articles first, and target-
ing ads. Initially, MediaCo collected observations from
affiliate sites in separate, isolated repositories; different
engineering teams used different repos to optimize these
processes for each affiliate site. Recently, MediaCo has
started to track users across sites using cookies and to
integrate all data into a central data lake. Excited about
the potential of the much richer information in the data
lake, MediaCo plans to provide indiscriminate access to
all engineers. However, aware of recent external hacking
and insider attacks affecting other companies, it worries
about the risks it assumes with such wide access.
MediaCo decides to use Pyramid to limit the expo-
sure of historical observations in anticipation of such
attacks. For MediaCo’s main workloads, which consist
of targeting and personalization, the company already
uses count featurization to address sparsity challenges;
hence, Pyramid is directly applicable for those work-
loads. They configure it by keeping Pyramid’s hot win-
dow of raw observations, along with its noise-infused
historical statistics, in the widely accessible data lake
so all engineers can train their models, tune them, and
explore new algorithms every day. Pyramid absorbs
many workload needs—current and evolving—as long
as the algorithms draw on the same user data to predict
the same outcome (e.g., whether a user will click on
an ad). MediaCo also configures a one-year retention
period for all observations; after this period, Pyramid
removes observations from the statistics and launches
retraining of all application models to purge the old
activity. Finally, MediaCo stores all raw observations in
an encrypted store whose read accesses are disabled by
default. Access to this store is granted temporarily and
on a case-by-case basis to engineers who demonstrate the
need for statistics beyond those that Pyramid maintains.
In addition to targeting/personalization workloads,
MediaCo has other, potentially non-ML workloads, such
as business analytics, trend studies, and forensics; for
these, count featurization may not apply. Hence, Medi-
aCo gives direct access to the raw-data store to engineers
managing these workloads and isolates their computa-
tional resources from the targeting/personalization teams.
Tattack
time
Tattack- ΔhotTattack- Δretention
data exposure 
to attack unexposedunexposed exposed unexposed
Tattack
stop
historical statistics 
(counts) store
unrestricted access
(can be compromised)
historical raw data store
restricted access
(assume not compromisable)
hot raw  
data 
store
Fig. 1: Threat model. Tattack: time the attack starts; T stopattack: time
the attack is eradicated; ∆hot: hot window length; ∆retention:
company’s data retention period.
With this configuration, MediaCo minimizes access to
its collected data on a needs basis. Assuming no entity
with full access to the historical raw data is malicious,
Pyramid guarantees the following (detailed in §II-B).
(1) Any observations preceding the hot window when
an attack begins will be hidden from the attacker. (2)
Hiding is done at an individual observation level during
the retention period and in bulk past the retention period.
(3) Only in exceptional circumstances do engineers get
access to the historical raw data. With these guarantees,
MediaCo negotiates lower data loss insurance premiums
and gains PR benefits for its efforts to protect user data.
II.B. Threat Model
Fig. 1 illustrates Pyramid’s threat model and guar-
antees. Pyramid gives guarantees similar to those of
forward secrecy: a one time compromise will not allow
an adversary to access all past data. Attacks are assumed
to have a well-defined start time, Tattack, when the
adversary gains access to the machines charged with
running Pyramid, and a well-defined end time, T stopattack,
when administrators discover and stop the intrusion.
Adversaries are assumed to not have had access to the
system before Tattack, nor to have performed any action
in anticipation of their attack (e.g., monitoring external
predictions, the hot window, or the models’ state), nor
to have continued access after T stopattack. The attacker’s goal
is to exfiltrate individual observations of user activities
(e.g., to know if a user clicked on a specific article/ad).
Historical raw data is assumed to be protected through
independent means and not compromised in this attack.
Pyramid’s goal is to limit the hot data in active use,
which is widely accessible to the attacker.
Examples of adversaries that fit our threat model
can be found among both the internal and external
adversaries of a company. An external adversary may
be a hacker who breaks into the company’s computing
infrastructure at time Tattack and starts looking for data
that may prove of value (e.g., information about celebri-
ties’ specific activities, what they liked or disliked, where
they were in the past, etc.). An internal adversary may
be a privacy-transgressing employee who spontaneously
decides at Tattack to look into some past action of a family
member or friend (e.g., to check if the person has visited
or liked a particular page).
After compromising Pyramid’s internal state, the at-
tacker will gain access to data in three different rep-
resentations: the hot data store containing plaintext ob-
servations, the historical counts, and the trained models
themselves. The plaintext observations in the hot data
store are not protected in any way. The historical statis-
tics store contains differentially private count tables of
the recent past. The attacker will learn some information
from the count tables but individual records will be
protected with a differentially private guarantee. Pyramid
forces models to be retrained when observations are
removed from the hot raw data store, so the attacker will
not be able to learn anything from the models beyond
what they have already learned above.
Pyramid provides three protection levels:
P1 No protection for present or future observations.
Observations in the hot data store when the attack
begins, plus observations added to the hot data store
while the attack is ongoing, receive no protection;
i.e., observations received between (Tattack − ∆hot)
and T stopattack receive no protection.
P2 Protection for individual observations for the length
of the retention period. Statistics about observations
are retained in differentially private count tables for
a predefined retention period ∆retention. The attacker
may learn broad statistics about observations in the
interval [Tattack − ∆retention, Tattack − ∆hot] but will
not be able to confidently determine if a specific
observation is present in the table.
P3 Protection in bulk past the retention period. Obser-
vations past their retention period (i.e., older than
Tattack −∆retention) have been phased out of the his-
torical statistics store and are protected separately
by the historical raw data store.
Finally, we assume that no states created based on the
hot raw data persist once the hot window is rolled over.
While we explicitly launch retraining of models regis-
tered with Pyramid, we operate under the assumption
that (1) the models’ states are securely erased [22] and
(2) no other state was created out of band based on the
raw hot data (such as copies made by programmers).
II.C. Design Requirements
Given the threat model, our design requirements are:
R1 Limit widely accessible data. The hot data window
is exposed to attackers; hence, Pyramid must limit
its size subject to application-level requirements,
such as the accuracy of models trained with it.
R2 Avoid accesses to historical raw data even for
evolving workloads. Pyramid must absorb as many
current and evolving workload needs as possible to
limit access to the historical raw data.
R3 Support retention policies. Pyramid must enforce
a company’s retention policies. Although Pyramid
provides a differential privacy guarantee, no protec-
tion is stronger than securely deleting data.
R4 Limit impact on accuracy, performance, scalability.
We intend to preserve the functional properties of
applications and models running on Pyramid.
III. The Pyramid Architecture
Pyramid, the first selective data management archi-
tecture, builds upon the ML technique of count-based
featurization and augments it with new mechanisms to
meet the preceding design requirements.
III.A. Background on Count-Based Featurization
Training predictive models can be challenging on data
that contains categorical variables (features) with large
numbers of possible values (e.g., an ID or an interest
vector). Existing ML techniques that handle large feature
spaces often make strong assumptions about the data,
e.g., assuming a linear relationship between the features
and the label (e.g., Lasso [23]). If the data does not meet
these assumptions, results can be very poor.
Count-based featurization [13] is a popular approach
to handling categorical variables of high cardinality.
Rather than directly using the value of a categorical vari-
able, this technique featurizes the data with the number
of times a particular feature value (e.g., a user ID) was
observed with each label and the conditional probability
of the label given the feature value. This substantially
reduces dimensionality. Suppose the raw data contains
d categorical features with an average cardinality of K
and a label of cardinality L, where K  L; e.g., in click
prediction K can be millions (number of users), while L
is 2 (click, non-click). Standard encoding of categorical
variables [24] results in a feature space of dimension
O(dK), whereas with count featurization it is O(dL).
Count featurization can also be applied to continuous
variables or continuous labels by first discretizing them;
this increases dimensionality but only by a small factor.
The dramatic dimensionality reduction yields impor-
tant benefits. It is known that fewer dimensions permit
more efficient learning, both statistically and computa-
tionally, potentially at the cost of reducing predictive
accuracy. However, count featurization makes it feasible
to apply advanced, nonlinear models, such as neural
networks, boosted trees, and random forests. This com-
bination of succinct data representation and powerful
learning models enables substantial reduction of the
training data with little loss in predictive performance.
Quantified in §V, this is the insight behind our use of
count-based featurization to limit data exposure.
III.B. Architectural Components
Fig. 2 shows Pyramid’s architecture. Pyramid manages
collected data (observations) on behalf of application
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Fig. 2: Pyramid’s architecture. Notation: ~x: feature vector; l:
label; ~x′: count-featurized feature vector; CT: count table.
models hosted by a model management system. In our
case, we use Velox [25], built on Spark. Velox facili-
tates ML-based targeting and personalization services by
implementing three functions: (1) fast, but incomplete,
incorporation of new observations into models that pro-
grammers register with Velox; (2) low-latency prediction
serving from these models; and (3) periodic retraining of
the models to correct inconsistencies created by the in-
complete incorporation of new observations. Velox saves
observations in a separate data management component,
Spark’s Tachyon. Pyramid replaces this component to
ensure rigorous and selective protection of observations.
Pyramid itself consists of four architectural compo-
nents, shown across the top of the highlighted box in
Fig. 2. The first is count featurization, which leverages
the known ML mechanism to count featurize observa-
tions before feeding them to models for training and pre-
diction. The second, third, and fourth are noise infusion,
data retention, and count selection, which augment count
featurization with differential privacy and a set of new
mechanisms to meet Pyramid’s design requirements. We
discuss each component in turn.
III.B.1. Count Featurization
Pyramid hijacks the stream of observations collected
by Velox (the observe method) and count-featurizes
them. An observation is a pair 〈~x, l〉 with a feature vector
~x = 〈x1, x2, ..., xd〉 and a label l. Application models
predict the label (or a probability for each possible
label) for a given feature vector by training on count-
featurized observations. When an observation arrives,
Pyramid incorporates it into two data structures: (1)
the hot raw data store, which retains observations from
the recent past, and (2) the historical statistics store,
which consists of multiple count tables that maintain the
number of occurrences of each feature with each label.
We maintain count tables for all features in ~x and for
               < userId, preferences, gender, age, // user features
                   urlHash, pageKeywords,                // context features
                   adId, adKeywords,                           // targeted item features
                   click >                                                 // label: click/no-click
 
userId clicks non-
clicks
0x1111 50 950
(b) Example count tables (one per feature/combo, time window):
           < 0x1111, ..., …, …, 0x7777, …, 0xAAAA, … >
          <   0.05,   ..., …, …,    0.15,   …,     0.1,       …,  0.33, … >
(c) Example of count-based featurization of
...
from userId table:
P(click | 0x1111) =
        50 / (50 + 950) = 0.05
from urlHash, adId table:
P(click | 0x7777, 0xAAAA) =
   5,000 / (5,000 + 10,000) = 0.33
...
(a) Observation format:
...
urlHash clicks non-
clicks
0x7777 15,000 85,000
adId clicks non-
clicks
0xAAAA 20,000 180,000
urlHash, 
adId
clicks non-
clicks
0x7777, 
0xAAAA 5,000 10,000
x⃗→ x⃗ ':
x⃗ :
x⃗ ' :
⟨ x⃗ , l⟩ :
Fig. 3: Count featurization example.
some feature combinations. A separate set of count tables
is maintained for each time window.
Featurization transforms a feature vector ~x into a
count-featurized feature vector ~x′, by replacing each
feature xi with the conditional probabilities of each label
value given xi’s value. The conditional probabilities are
computed directly from the count tables as discussed
below. To train its models, an application requests a
training set from Pyramid (getTrainSet). Pyramid
featurizes the hot raw data with historical counts and
returns it to the application. To predict the label for a
feature vector ~x, the application requests its featurization
from Pyramid (featurize); Pyramid returns ~x′.
Example. Fig. 3 shows (a) a sample observation format,
(b) some count tables used by Pyramid to count-featurize
it, and (c) a sample count-featurized observation.
• Observation format. In targeting and personalization,
an observation’s feature vector ~x typically consists of
user features (e.g., id, gender, age, and previously com-
piled preferences) and contextual information for the
observation (e.g., the URL of the article or the ad shown
to the user, plus any features of these). The label l might
indicate whether the user clicked on the article/ad.
• Count tables. Once an observation stream of the pre-
ceding type is registered with Pyramid, the userId table
maintains for each user the number of clicks the user has
made on any ad shown and the number of non-clicks; it
therefore encodes each user’s propensity to click on ads.
The urlHash table maintains for each URL the number of
clicks that each user made on any ad shown on that page;
it therefore encodes the page’s inherent “ad-clickability.”
Pyramid maintains count tables for every feature in ~x and
for some feature combinations with predictive potential,
such as the 〈urlHash, adId〉 table, which encodes the
joint probability of a particular ad being clicked when it
is shown on a particular page.
• Count featurization. To count-featurize a fea-
ture vector ~x = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xd〉, Pyramid first re-
places each of its features with the conditional
probabilities computed from the count tables, e.g.,
~x′ = 〈P (click|x1), P (click|x2), . . . , P (click|xd)〉, where
P (click|xi) = clicksclicks+non-clicks from the row matching the
value of xi in the table corresponding to xi. Pyramid
also appends to ~x′ the conditional probabilities for any
feature combinations it maintains. Fig. 3(c) shows an
example of feature vector ~x and its count-featurized
version ~x′. This is a simplified version of the count
featurization function. We can also include the raw
counts in ~x′, and support non-binary categorical labels
by including conditional probabilities for each label. To
avoid featurizing with an effectively random probability
when a given feature value has very few counts, we
estimate the variance of our probability estimate and, if it
is too high, featurize with a default probability P (click).
• Training and prediction. Suppose a boosted-tree model
is trained on a count-featurized dataset (〈~x′, l〉 pairs). It
might find that for users with a click propensity over
0.04, the chances of a click are high for ads whose
clickability exceeds 0.05 placed on websites with ad-
clickability over 0.1. In this case, the model would
predict a “click” label for the feature vector in Fig. 3(c).
Process. Pyramid count-featurizes all features xi for
each observation type. For categorical features, we fea-
turize them as described above. For low-cardinality fea-
tures, we can additionally include the raw feature values
in ~x′ alongside the conditional probabilities. Continuous
features are first mapped to a discrete space, binning
them by percentiles, and then count-featurized as cate-
gorical. We do the same with continuous labels.
Pyramid maintains hot windows and count tables as
follows. There is one hot window for each observation
stream. There is one count table per feature or feature
group; it has a column for each label and a row for
each value the feature can take. To support granular
retention times, each count table is composed of multiple
windowed count tables holding data for observations
collected during disjoint windows of time. The complete
count table is the sum of the associated windowed count
tables. When a new observation arrives, it is added to
the hot window and made immediately available to the
models for (re)training. The hot window is a sliding
window that may be sized differently from the count
table window. It is also added to the current windowed
count table; this count table is withheld when computing
the complete count table until it is finished populating.
At this point, Pyramid begins using it as part of the
featurization process, phases out the oldest count table if
it is past its retention period, and begins populating a new
count table that has been initialized with differentially
private noise. Once count tables are incorporated into
the featurization process, they are never updated again.
Count-min sketches (CMSes). A key challenge with
count featurization is its storage requirement. For a
categorical variable of cardinality K and a label of
cardinality L, the count table is of size O(LK). A
common solution, used in Azure [20], is to store each
table in a Count-Min Sketch (CMS) [26], a data structure
that approximates counts in sub-linear space. A CMS
consists of a 2D array with an independent hash function
for each row. When a new feature arrives, the CMS uses
the hash function for each row to assign the feature to a
column and increment the value in that cell.
We query the CMS for a feature count by hashing
the feature into a column of each row and taking the
minimum value. Despite overcounting from collisions,
CMS provides sufficiently accurate count estimates to
train ML models. With a CMS, we can maintain more
and/or larger count tables with bounded storage over-
heads. This gives developers flexibility in the types of
modeling they can do atop in-use data without tapping
into the historical data store. The CMS poses challenges
to our noise infusion process, as described next.
III.B.2. Noise Infusion
Pyramid’s key contribution is to retrofit count fea-
turization, a technique developed for performance and
scalability, to protect past observations against exposure
to attack. Pyramid infuses noise into the count tables to
protect these observations. While we leverage differential
privacy methods [21], correctly applying these methods
in our context poses scaling challenges. For example,
each observation contributes to multiple count tables,
increasing the noise required to guarantee differential
privacy, and a naı¨ve application degrades accuracy when
there are many count tables. We present two techniques
to address this challenge. First, we use a weighted noise
infusion technique to mitigate the impact of noise, allow-
ing us to navigate the privacy/utility trade-off. Second,
for high noise levels, we replace the CMS by a count-
median sketch [27], a data structure with weaker accu-
racy guarantees than CMS but that provides an unbiased
frequency estimate, making it more robust to negative
noise values. To our knowledge, we are the first to
observe that the count-median sketch structure is better
suited to differential privacy. After a brief overview of
differential privacy, we describe these techniques.
Differential privacy properties. Pyramid’s noise infu-
sion component uses four differential privacy properties:
1. Privacy guarantees: Let D1 be the database of past
observations, D2 be a database that differs from D1
by exactly one observation (i.e., D2 adds or removes 1
observation), and S the range of all possible count tables
that can result from a randomized query Q() that builds
a count table from a window of observations. The count
table query Q() is -differentially private if P [Q(D1) ∈
S] ≤ e × P [Q(D2) ∈ S]. In other words, adding or
removing an observation in D1 does not significantly
change the probability distribution of possible count
tables; therefore, the count table does not leak significant
information about any specific observation [21].  is
called the query’s privacy budget.
2. Laplace distribution: Let a query’s sensitivity be the
magnitude of the change in the query result triggered
by adding or removing a single observation. If the
query has sensitivity ∆, then adding noise drawn from a
Laplace distribution with scale parameter ∆ guarantees
that the result is -differentially private [21]. Increasing
∆
 increases the standard deviation of the distribution
(stdev of a Laplace distribution with parameter b is b
√
2).
3. Composability: Differentially private queries are
composable: the sum of n n-differentially private
queries is (Σn)-differentially private [28]. This lets us
maintain multiple count tables, possibly with different
budgets, and combine them without breaking guarantees.
(Advanced composition theorems allow sublinear loss in
the privacy budget by relaxing the guarantees to (, δ)-
differential privacy [29], but we do not explore that here.)
4. Post-processing resilience: Any computation on a
differentially private data release remains differentially
private [29]. This is a crucial point for Pyramid’s protec-
tion guarantees: it ensures that guarantee P2, the protec-
tion of individual past observations during their lifetime,
holds for each model’s internal state and outputs. As long
as models comply with retrain calls and erase all internal
state when they do, their output is differentially private
with regard to observations outside the hot window.
Basic noise infusion process. We apply these known
properties when creating count tables for the hot window.
Upon creating a count table, we initialize each cell of
the CMS storing that table with a random draw from
a Laplace distribution. This noise is added only once:
the count tables are updated as observations arrive and
are sealed when the hot window rolls over. To determine
the correct parameter for the Laplace distribution, b, we
must account for three factors: (1) the internal structure
of the CMS, (2) the number of observations we want to
hide simultaneously, and (3) the number of count tables
(features or feature combinations) we are maintaining.
First, an exact count table has sensitivity 1 since
adding or removing an observation can only change one
count by 1. For a CMS, each observation is counted
once per hash function; hence, the sensitivity is h, the
number of hash functions. Second, if we aim to hide any
group of k observations with a privacy budget of , then
we make a count table -differentially private by adding
noise from a Laplace distribution of parameter b = hk in
every cell of the CMS. Third, we must maintain multiple
count tables for the different features and feature groups.
Since each observation affects every count table, we need
to split the privacy budget  among them, e.g., splitting
it evenly by adding noise with b = nhk to each table.
The third consideration poses a significant challenge
for Pyramid: the amount of noise we apply grows lin-
early with the number of count tables we keep. Since the
amount of noise directly affects application accuracy, this
yields a protection/accuracy tradeoff, which we address
with weighted noise infusion.
Weighted noise infusion process. We note that count
tables are not all equally susceptible to noise. For ex-
ample in our movie recommender, the user table most
likely contains low values, since each user rates only a
few movies (29 for the median user). Moreover, we do
not expect this count to change significantly when adding
more data, since single users will not rate significantly
more movies. Each genre table however contains higher
values (1M or more), since each genre characterizes
multiple movies, each rated by many users. Sharing noise
equally between tables would pollute all counts by a
standard deviation of 145 ( = 1, h = 5, and k = 1),
a reasonable amount for genres, but devastating for the
user feature, which essentially becomes random.
Pyramid’s weighted noise infusion distributes the
privacy budget unevenly across count tables, adding
less noise to low-count features. This way, we retain
more utility from those tables, and the composability
property of differential privacy preserves our protection
guarantees. Each table’s share of noise is determined
automatically, based on the count values observed in the
hot window. Specifically, the user specifies a quantile,
and the privacy budget is shared between each feature
proportionally to this quantile of its counts. For instance
we use the first percentile, so that 99% of the counts for
a feature will be less affected by the noise. Sharing the
privacy budget proportionally to the counts is a heuristic
that makes the noise’s standard-deviation proportional to
the typical counts of each feature. This scheme is also
independent of the learning algorithm.
Section V shows that weighted noise infusion is vital
for providing protection while preserving accuracy at
scale: without it, the cost of hiding single observations
is a 15% accuracy loss; with it, the loss is less than 5%.
The weight selection process must be made differen-
tially private lest it may leak information about the hot
window used to compute the weights. While our IEEE
Security & Privacy paper [30] did not address this prob-
lem, we have since modified Pyramid to compute feature
weights in a differentially private way. §A describes
our method, which can be summarized as follows. We
compute the weights every so often (e.g., every month)
using the data in one hot window. We use a configurable
portion of one window’s privacy budget and leverage
smooth sensitivity [31] to compute differentially private
count percentiles, which we then use as feature weights.
We compute differentially private percentiles by adapting
the J-List algorithm for the differentially private median
described in [31]. §A2 shows that we can make the
weighted noise infusion calculation differentially private
without reducing the accuracy wins gained from doing
weighted noise infusion.
Unbiased private count-median sketch. Another factor
that degrades performance when adding differentially
private noise is the interaction between the noise and
the CMS. In the CMS, the final estimate for a count is
min(hi(key)) for each row i. The minimum makes sense
here since collisions can only increase the counts. The
Laplace distribution however is symmetric around zero,
so we may add negative noise to the counts. Taking the
minimum of multiple draws—each cell is initiated with
a random draw from the distribution—thus selects the
most extreme negative values, creating a downward bias
that can be very large for a small .
We observe that because the mean of the Laplace
distribution is 0, an unbiased estimator would not suffer
from this drawback. For tables with large noise, we thus
use a count-median sketch [27], which differs in two
ways: 1) each row i has another hash function si that
maps the key to a random sign si(key) ∈ {+1,−1}, with
each cell updated with si(key)hi(key); 2) the estimator is
the median of all counts multiplied by their sign, instead
of the minimum. The signed update means that collisions
have an expected impact of zero, since they have an equal
chance of being negative or positive, making the cell an
unbiased estimate of the true count. The median is a
robust estimate that preserves the unbiased property.
Using this count-median sketch reduces the impact
of noise, since values from the Laplace distribution are
exponentially concentrated around the mean of zero. §V
shows that for small , or a large number of features, it
is worth trading the CMS’s better guarantees for reduced
noise impact with the count-median sketch.
III.B.3. Data Retention
While differential privacy provides a reasonable level
of protection for past observations, complete removal
of information remains the cleanest, strongest form of
protection (design R3 in §II-C). Pyramid supports data
expiration with windowed count tables. When an obser-
vation arrives, Pyramid updates the count tables for the
current count window only. To featurize ~x, Pyramid sums
the relevant counts across windows. Periodically, it drops
the oldest window and invokes retraining of all models
in Velox (retrain method). Our use of count-based
featurization supports such behaviors because retraining
is cheap (§V-E), so we can afford to do it frequently.
III.B.4. Count Selection
Pyramid seeks to support workload evolution (model
changes/additions, such as future model M4 in Fig. 2)
using only the widely accessible stores without tapping
into the historical raw data store. To do so, it uses two
approaches. First, it stores the count tables in a very
compact representation—the count-median sketches—so
it can afford to keep plenty of count tables. Second, it
includes an automatic process of count table selection
that inspects the data to identify feature combinations
worth counting, whether they are used in the current
workloads or not. This technique is useful because
count featurization tends to obscure correlations between
features. For example, different users may have different
opinions about specific ads. Although that information
could be inferred by a learning algorithm from the raw
data points, it is not accessible in the count-featurized
data unless we explicitly count the joint occurrences of
specific users with specific ads, i.e., maintain a table for
the 〈userId, adId〉 group.
We adapted several feature selection techniques [32] to
select feature groups and describe one here. Mutual In-
formation (MI) is a measure of dependence between two
random variables. A common feature selection technique
keeps features of high MI with the label. We extend
this mechanism for group count selection. Our goal is
to identify feature groups that provide more information
about the label than individual features. For each feature
xi, we find all other features xj such that xi and xj
together exhibit higher MI with the label than xi alone.
From these groups, we select a configurable number with
highest MIs. To find promising groups of larger sizes,
we apply this process greedily, trying out new features
with existing groups. For each selected group, Pyramid
creates and maintains a count table.
This exploration of promising groups operates on the
hot window of raw data. Because the hot raw data is
limited, the selection may not be entirely reliable. There-
fore, count tables for new groups are added on a “trial
basis.” As more data accumulates in the counts, Pyramid
re-evaluates them by computing the MI metric on the
count tables. With the increased amount of data, Pyramid
can make a more reliable decision regarding which
count tables to keep and which to drop. Because count
selection—like feature selection—is never perfect, we
give engineers an API to specify groups that they know
are worth counting from domain knowledge. Finally, like
the weight selection process, count selection should be
made differentially private so the groups selected in a
particular hot window, which are preserved over time,
do not leak information about the window’s data in
the future. §A3 proposes a method for making count
selection private.
III.C. Supported Workload Evolution
Count featurization is a model-independent prepro-
cessing step, allowing Pyramid to absorb some common
evolutions during an ML application’s life cycle without
tapping the historical raw data store. §V-G gives anecdo-
tal evidence of this claim from a production workload.
This section reviews the types of workload changes
Pyramid currently absorbs.
A developer may want to change four aspects of the
model: (1) the algorithm used to train the model (2)
hyperparameters for the model or for the underlying
optimization algorithm, (3) features used by the model,
and (4) the predicted label. Pyramid supports (1) and (2),
partially supports (3), and usually does not support (4).
• Algorithm changes: Supported. Pyramid allows devel-
opers to move between types of models and libraries
used to train those models as long as they are using
features and labels that are already counted. In our eval-
uation we experimented with linear models and neural
networks in Vowpal Wabbit [33] and gradient boosted
trees in scikit-learn [34] using the same count tables.
• Hyperparameter tuning: Supported. By far the most
common type of model change we encountered, both
in our own evaluation and in reports from a produc-
tion setting, was hyperparameter tuning. For example, a
developer may want to change model hyperparameters,
such as the number of hidden units in a neural network,
or tune parameters of the underlying optimization algo-
rithm, such as the learning rate or an L1/L2 regulariza-
tion penalty. Changing hyperparameters is independent
from the underlying features so is supported by Pyramid.
• Feature changes: Partially supported. Pyramid sup-
ports making minimal feature changes. A developer may
want to perform one of three types of feature changes:
adding new features, removing existing features, or
adding interactions between existing features. Pyramid
trivially supports removing existing features, and lets
developers add new features if they are based on existing
ones. For example, the developer could not create an
〈Age, Location〉 feature interaction if the individual fea-
tures were not already counted together. Introducing new
feature combinations or interactions requires creating
new count tables. This highlights the importance of count
selection to support workload evolution.
• Label changes: Mostly unsupported. Changes in pre-
dicted labels are not supported except if a new label
is a subset of an existing label. For example, a news
recommender could not start predicting retention time
instead of clicks unless retention time was previously
declared as a label. As with features, Pyramid can
support label changes when the new label is a subset of
an existing one. For example, if a label exists that tracks
retention time in time buckets, Pyramid can support new,
coarser labels, such as the three classes “0 seconds,” “less
than a minute,” and “more than a minute.”
III.D. Summary
With these components, Pyramid meets the design re-
quirements noted in §II-C, as follows. R1: By enhancing
the training set with historical statistics gathered over a
longer period of time, we minimize the hot data. R2: By
automatically identifying combinations of features worth
maintaining, we avoid having to access the historical
raw data for workloads that use the same observation
streams to predict the same label. R3: By rolling the
count windows and retraining the application models, we
support data retention policies, albeit at a coarse level.
§V evaluates R4: accuracy and performance impact.
IV. Prototype
Pyramid is implemented in 2600 lines of Scala, as a
modular library. It integrates into the feature engineering
stage of an ML pipeline, before the actual learning
algorithms are invoked. The modular backend allows
count tables to be stored locally in memory or in a
remote datastore such as Redis or Cassandra.
We integrated Pyramid into the Velox model manage-
ment system [25] with minimal effort, by adding/modi-
fying around 500 lines of code. The changes we made to
Velox involve interposing on all of Velox’s interfaces that
interact with raw data (e.g., adding observations, making
predictions, and retraining). Now prediction requests are
passed through the Pyramid featurization layer, which
performs count featurization.
One of Velox’s key contributions is performing low
latency predictions by pushing models to application
servers. To enable low-latency predictions, Pyramid pe-
riodically replicates snapshots of the central count tables
to the application servers, allowing them to perform fea-
turization locally. §V-E evaluates prediction performance
in Velox/Pyramid with and without this optimization.
V. Evaluation
We evaluate Pyramid using different versions of three
data-driven applications: two ad targeting applications,
two movie recommendation applications, and MSN’s
production news personalization system. We compare
models on count-featurized data to state-of-the-art mod-
els trained on raw data, and answer these questions:
Q1. Can we accurately learn on less data using counts?
Q2. How does past-data protection impact utility?
Q3. Does counting feature groups improve accuracy?
Q4. How efficient is Pyramid?
Q5. To what problems does Pyramid apply?
Our evaluation yields four findings: (1) On classifica-
tion problems, count featurization lets models perform
within 4% of state-of-the-art models while training on
less than 1% of the data. (2) Count featurization enables
App Dataset Obs. Feat. Baseline
Ad targeting (classifica-
tion)
Criteo Kag-
gle [35]
45M 39 neural net in
Kaggle [36]
Ad targeting (classifica-
tion)
Criteo
Full [37]
1.2B 39 regularized lin-
ear model
Movie recommendation
(classification)
MovieLens
[38]
22M 21 matrix factor-
ization [33]
Movie recommendation
(regression)
MovieLens
[38]
22M 21 matrix factor-
ization [33]
News personalization
(regression)
MSN.com
production
24M 507 contextual ban-
dits [39], [40]
TABLE I: Workloads. Apps and datasets; number of observations
and features in each dataset; and baselines used for comparison. All
baselines are trained using VW [33].
Dataset Model Parameters
Criteo-Kaggle
B: neural net (nn) VW. One 35 nodes hidden layer
with tanh activation. LR: 0.15.
BP: 25. Passes: 20. Early Termi-
nate: 1.
logistic regression
(log. reg.)
VW. LR: 0.5. BP: 26.
gradient boosted
trees (gbt)
Sklearn. 100 trees with 8 leaves.
Subsample: 0.5. LR: 0.1. BP: 8.
Criteo-Full B: ridge regression
(rdg. reg.)
VW. L2 penalty: 1.5e−8. LR:
0.5. BP: 26.
MovieLens
Regression
B: singular value
decomposition
(svd)
VW. Rank 10. L2 penalty: 0.001.
LR: 0.015. BP: 18. Passes: 20. LR
Decay: 0.97. PowerT: 0.
linear regression
(lin. reg.)
VW. LR: 0.5. BP: 22. Passes: 5.
Early Terminate: 1.
gradient boosted
trees (gbt)
Sklearn. 100 trees with 8 leaves.
Subsample: 0.5. LR: 0.1. BP: 8.
MovieLens
Classification
B: singular value
decomposition
(svd)
VW. Rank 10. L2 penalty: 0.001.
LR: 0.015. BP: 18. Passes: 20. LR
decay: 0.97. PowerT: 0.
logistic regression
(log. reg.)
VW. LR: 0.5. BP: 22. Passes: 5.
Early Terminate: 1.
gradient boosted
trees (gbt)
Sklearn. 100 trees with 8 leaves.
Subsample: 0.5. LR: 0.1. BP: 8.
MSN.com contextual bandit VW. IPS context. bandit. LR:
0.02. BP: 18.
TABLE II: Model parameters. The libraries and parameters used to
train each model. The parameters not noted use library defaults. “LR”
indicates the learning rate. “BP” indicates the hash featurization’s bit
precision (only applicable to raw models). “PowerT” exponent controls
learning learning rate decay per step. “B:” indicates that the model
will be used as a baseline. VW and Sklearn denote that the model was
trained with Vowpal Wabbit [33] and scikit-learn [34], respectively.
powerful nonlinear algorithms, such as neural networks
and boosted trees, that would be infeasible due to high-
cardinality features. (3) Protecting individual past obser-
vations with differential privacy adds 1% penalty to the
accuracy, which remains within 5% of state-of-the-art
models. (4) Pyramid’s performance overheads are small.
V.A. Methodology
Workloads. Table I shows our apps, datasets, and base-
lines. We defer discussion of MSN to §V-G.
• Criteo ad targeting. Using two versions of the well-
known Criteo ads dataset, we build a binary click/no-
click classifier. We use seven days of the Criteo ad click
dataset amounting to 1.2 billion total observations. This
dataset is very imbalanced with an approximate click
rate of 3.34%. The second version of the Criteo dataset
has 45 million observations, and was released as part of
a Kaggle competition. In the Criteo Kaggle dataset, the
click and non-click points were sampled at different rates
to create a more balanced class split with a 25% click
rate. Each observation has 39 features (13 numeric, 26
categorical), and 8 of the categorical features are high
dimensional (> 100K values). The numeric features
were binned into 4 equal size bins for each dataset. As
a baseline, we use a feed-forward neural network that
performed well for the competition dataset [36], and we
use ridge regression for the full dataset.
• MovieLens movie recommendation. Using the well-
known MovieLens dataset, which consists of 22M rat-
ings on 34K movies from 240K users, we build two
predictors: (1) a regression model that predicts the user’s
rating as a continuous value in [0, 5], (2) a binary classi-
fier that predicts if a user will give a rating of 4 or more.
As a baseline, we use the matrix factorization algorithm
in Vowpal Wabbit (VW) [33]; algorithms in this class are
state-of-the-art for recommender systems [41], although
this specific implementation is not the most advanced.
Method. For each application, we try a variety of count
models, including linear or logistic regression, neural
networks, and boosted trees. We split each dataset by
time into a training set (80%) and testing set (20%),
except for the full Criteo dataset for which we use the
first six days for training and the seventh for testing.
On the training set, we compute the counts and train our
models on windows of growing sizes, where all windows
contain the most recent training data and grow back-
wards to include older data. This ensures that training
occurs on the most recent data (closest to the testing
set), and that count tables only include observations from
the hot window or the past. We use the testing set to
compare the performance of our count algorithms to their
raw data counterparts and to the baseline algorithms.
For all baselines, we apply any dimensionality reduction
mechanisms (e.g., hash featurization [42]) that those
models typically apply to strengthen them.
Metrics. We use two model accuracy metrics.
(1) The average logistic loss for classification problems
with categorical labels (e.g. click/no-click). Algorithms
predict a probability for each class and are penalized
by the logarithm of the probability predicted for the
true class: − log(ptrue class). Models are penalized less
for incorrect, low-confidence predictions and more for
incorrect, high-confidence predictions. Logistic loss is
better suited than accuracy for classification problems
with imbalanced classes because a model cannot perform
well simply by returning the most common class.
(2) The average squared loss for regression problems
with continuous labels. Algorithms make real-valued
predictions that are penalized by the square of the
difference with the label: ||prediction− label||2.
We conclude our evaluation with our experience with
a production setting, in which we can directly estimate
click-through rate, a more intuitive metric.
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(b) Criteo-Kaggle classification
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(c) Criteo-Full classification
Fig. 4: Normalized losses for raw and count algorithms. “B:” denotes the baseline model. Count algorithms converge faster than raw data
algorithms, to results that are within 4% on MovieLens, and within 2% and 4% on Criteo Kaggle and full respectively.
Result interpretation. All graphs report loss normalized
by the baseline model trained on the entire training data.
Lower values are better in all graphs: a value of 1 or less
means that we beat the baseline’s best performance; and
a value > 1 means that we do worse than the baseline.
For completeness, we specify our baselines’ perfor-
mance: MovieLens classification matrix factorization has
a logistic loss of 0.537; MovieLens regression matrix
factorization has a squared loss of 0.697; Criteo-Kaggle
neural network has a logistic loss of 0.467; and Criteo-
Full ridge regression has a logistic loss of 0.136.
V.B. Training Set Reduction (Q1)
Pyramid’s design is predicated on count featurization’s
ability to substantially reduce training sets. While this
method has long been known, we are unaware of scien-
tific studies of its effectiveness for training set reduction.
We hence perform a study here. The count models must
converge faster than raw-data models (reach their best
performance with less data), and perform on par with
state-of-the-art baselines. Fig. 4 shows the performance
of several linear and nonlinear models, on raw and count-
featurized data. We make two observations.
First, training with counts requires less data. On
both Criteo and MovieLens the best count-featurized
algorithm approaches the best raw-data algorithm by
training on 1% of the data or less. On Criteo-Kaggle
(Fig. 4(b)), the count-featurized neural network comes
within 3% of the baseline when trained on 0.4% of the
data and performs within 1.7% of the baseline with 28%
of the training data. On Criteo-Full (Fig. 4(c)), the count-
featurized ridge regression model comes within 3.3%
of the baseline with only 0.1% of the data, and within
2.5% when trained on 15% of the data. These results
show that models trained on count-featurized data can
perform close to raw models in both balanced and very
imbalanced datasets (Criteo Full and Kaggle’s respective
click rates are 3% and 25%). On MovieLens (Fig. 4(a)),
the count-featurized boosted tree needs only 0.8% of
the data to get within 4% of the baseline, or match the
raw data logistic regression. Because counts summarize
history and reduce dimensionality, they allow algorithms
to perform well with very little data. We say that they
converge faster than raw data algorithms.
Second, counts enable new models. In Fig. 4, the
boosted tree performs poorly on raw data but very well
on the count-featurized data. This reveals an interesting
insight. The raw-data boosted tree uses a dimensional-
ity reduction technique known as feature hashing [42],
which hashes all categorical values to a limited-size
space. This technique exhibits a trade-off: increasing the
hash space reduces collisions at the cost of introducing
more features, leading to overfitting. Count featurization
does not have this problem: a categorical feature is
mapped to a few new features (roughly one per label
value). This lets us train boosted trees very effectively.
V.C. Past-Data Protection Evaluation (Q2)
We have shown that count-featurized algorithms con-
verge faster than models trained on raw data. This allows
Pyramid to keep, and thus expose, only a small amount
of raw data to train ML models. However the count
tables, while only aggregates of past data, can still leak
information about past observations. To prevent such
leaks, Pyramid adds differentially private noise to the
tables. The amount of noise to add depends on the
desired privacy guarantee, parameterized by  (smaller
is more private), but also on the number of features (see
Table I) and CMS hash functions (five here), through
the formula from §III-B2. In this section we evaluate
the noise’s impact on performance, as well as Pyramid’s
two mechanisms that increase data utility: automatic
weighted noise infusion and the use of private count-
median sketches. We also show the impact of the number
of windows used, which defines the granularity at which
past observations can be entirely dropped.
Impact of noise. Fig. 5 shows the performance of
different algorithms and datasets when protecting an
observation, k = 1, with different privacy budgets 
(note the direct tradeoff between the two parameters:
the noise is proportional to k ). We find that Pyramid
can protect observations with minimal performance loss.
When  = 1, the boosted tree model on the MovieLens
dataset remains within 5% of the baseline with only 1%
of the training data. The logistic regression and neural
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Fig. 5: Impact of data protection. Results are normalized by the baselines. We fix k = 1 and vary , the privacy budget. Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b)
show results using the weighted noise (denoted wght). On MovieLens our weighting scheme is crucial to hide 1 observation. On Criteo we can
easily hide 1 observation with little performance degradation and can hide up to 100 observations while remaining within 5% of the baseline.
network models on the Criteo-Kaggle dataset perform
within 2.7% and 1.8% of the baseline respectively, and
the Criteo-Full ridge regression is within 3%. All Criteo
models also come within 5% of their respective baseline
with a privacy budget as small as  = 0.2.
The Criteo-Full ridge regression performance de-
grades less than models on other datasets when the noise
increases. For instance, it degrades by less than 1% with
 going from 1 to 0.1, while the Criteo-Kaggle neural
network loses 6.5%. This is explained by the fact that the
amount of noise required to make a query differentially
private is not related to the size of the dataset. The
Criteo-Full dataset is much larger, so the additional noise
is much smaller relative to the counts.
Weighted noise infusion. Weighted noise infusion is in-
tegral to the protection of past observations with minimal
performance cost. Fig. 6(a) shows the impact of noise
on the boosted tree for the MovieLens dataset. Without
weighting the privacy budget of different features, the
model performs 15% worse than the baseline even for
 = 1. With non-private weighting, the MovieLens
model performs at 5% of the baseline. The weighted
noise infusion technique is thus critical to maintaining
performance on the MovieLens dataset. Intuitively, this is
because the users making the rating and the movie being
rated are the most important features when predicting
ratings. Most users rate relatively few movies, and a long
tail of movies are rarely rated, so their respective counts
are quickly overwhelmed by the noise when the privacy
budget is equally distributed among all features.
The Criteo models do not depend as much on the
weighting trick, since they do not rely on a few features
with small counts. Noise weighting is still beneficial,
though: e.g., the Criteo-Kaggle neural network gains
about 0.5% of performance, as shown in Fig. 6(b).
Private count-median sketch. Another technique that
Pyramid uses to reduce the impact of noise is to switch
to a private count-median sketch. As noted in §III-B2,
the count-min sketch will exhibit a strong downward bias
when initialized with differentially private noise, because
taking the minimum of multiple observations will select
the most extreme negative noise values. The count-
median sketch uses the median instead of the minimum
and does not suffer from this effect. Fig. 6(c) shows that
when noise is added, the count-median sketch improves
performance over the count-min sketch by around 0.5%,
on MovieLens and Criteo-Kaggle.
When combined with weighted noise infusion, the pri-
vate count-median sketch is less useful at first, since the
noise is small on features with small counts. However, it
provides an improvement for lower . For instance, the
MovieLens boosted tree improves by 0.5% even after
noise weighting for  = 0.10.
Number of windows. Another factor impacting accuracy
is the number of count windows kept to support granular
retention policies. Fig. 7 shows Criteo-Full’s ridge
regression for k = 1 and  = 1 while varying the
number of windows. We observe that it is possible to
support a large number of windows. On Criteo, we can
support 1000 windows with little degradation, enough
to support a daily granularity for a multi-year retention
period. While we believe this granularity for retention
policies should be enough in practice, we also simulated
a binary tree scheme [43] that supports huge numbers of
windows. We can see that on Criteo, this allows using
100K windows with a penalty similar to 10 windows
using the basic scheme.
V.D. Count Selection Evaluation (Q3)
Without noise. We measure the performance of our
algorithms when the featurization is augmented by MI-
selected groups. We evaluate on MovieLens, as groups
provided little additional benefit on Criteo. A total of
35 groups were selected by MI and given 10% of the
privacy budget to share. When using these groups, the
accuracy of the count boosted tree gets within 3% of
the baseline with the same 0.8% of the data, 1% better
than without feature groups. Logistic regression does
not improve asymptotically but converges faster, getting
within 5% of the baseline with 15% of the data instead
of 22%. Thus, count selection selects relevant groups.
With noise. We also evaluate the impact of group se-
lection on MovieLens with noise k = 1,  = 1. Logistic
regression is not improved by the grouped features, but
the boosted tree is still 1% closer to the baseline. Thus,
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Fig. 6: Impact of data protection (continued). Results are normalized to the baselines. We fix k = 1 and vary , the privacy budget. (a)
Without the feature weighting trick the gradient boosted trees perform unacceptably poorly. (b) The weighting trick marginally improves the
performance of Criteo-Kaggle models over equally distributing the privacy budget. (c) Private count-median sketch improves performance in
both MovieLens (ML) and Criteo-Kaggle (CK) models with  = 1.
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Boosted tree converges quickly but does not
match the baseline.
Action P. w/o cache P. w/ cache Velox
Featurization 99.22% 4.37% N/A
Marshalling 0.04% 6.44% 7.06%
Prediction 0.01% 0.51% 0.63%
Network/Framework 0.73% 88.68% 92.31%
Total Latency 283.69 ms 1.65 ms 1.58 ms
Fig. 9: Prediction Latency. Median time to serve
a model prediction. Caching is crucial for Pyramid
to achieve low overhead compared to Velox.
the algorithm can still extract useful information from
the groups despite the increased noise.
While these results are encouraging, we leave for fu-
ture work the full investigation of how the improvement
in accuracy gained from maintaining and using relevant
groups is affected by the higher noise levels necessary
to maintain a large number of count tables for fixed .
V.E. Performance Evaluation (Q4)
We evaluate Pyramid’s overhead on Velox by mea-
suring the median latency of a prediction request to
Velox. We perform this evaluation using the 39-feature
Criteo dataset. Fig. 9 shows the median latencies and a
breakdown of the time into four components: computing
the prediction, unmarshalling the message into a usable
form, performing count featurization, and other functions
like the network and traversing the web stack. We show
the results with and without count table caching in the
application servers (§IV). Without caching, prediction
latency is around 200ms. Caching reduces it to 1.6ms,
a 5% overhead with the total time dominated by the
network and traversing the web framework used to
implement Velox. Pushing count tables to the application
servers is crucial for performance and does not signifi-
cantly increase the attack surface.
V.F. Applicability Evaluation (Q5)
Pyramid works well for classification problems. We
now consider another broad class of supervised learning
problems: regression problems. In regression, the algo-
rithm guesses a label on a continuous scale, and the goal
is for the prediction to be as close to the true label as
possible. Intuitively, count featurization should be less
effective for regression problems, because it needs to
bin the continuous label into discrete buckets.
Fig. 8 shows the performance of linear and boosted
tree (nonlinear) regressions on the MovieLens dataset.
We first observe that linear regression does worse on
count-featurized data than on raw data. This is not sur-
prising: count featurization gives the probability of each
label conditioned on a feature. The algorithm cannot find
a linear relationship between, say, P (rating = 3|user)
and the rating. Indeed, the rating does not keep growing
with this probability, it keeps getting closer to 3.
Nonlinear algorithms do not have this limitation. The
boosted tree converges quickly and outperforms raw
models trained on similar amounts of data until we reach
55% of the data. At that point, the boosted tree plateaus
and never comes close to the baseline. Although we did
not find good algorithms for this dataset, we suspect that
some nonlinear algorithms may perform well on counts.
Count featurization is most reminiscent of the counts
used by Naive Bayes classifiers [44], and there are
workloads for which it is not suitable. For instance, count
featurization requires a label and is thus not applicable
to unsupervised learning. Other feature representations
may be better suited to such types of models. Our
choice of count featurization reflects its suitability to data
protection in a practical system architecture.
Even in settings that are less amenable to Pyramid,
such as online learning applications that avoid retraining,
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Fig. 10: Estimated article CTR for MSN. The raw model, count
model, and private count model are normalized against the estimated
performance of human editors. The count models perform slightly
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five out of seven days.
we found that Pyramid can perform well and help protect
past observations, as we describe in the next section.
V.G. Experience with a Production Setting
In addition to public datasets, we also evaluated
Pyramid on a production workload. One of the authors
helped build MSN’s news personalization service, which
we used to evaluate three aspects: (1) How to adapt
count featurization to a different type of learning, (2)
how Pyramid applies to this application, and (3) how
Pyramid supports the application’s workload evolution.
Adapting count featurization. MSN uses contextual
bandit learning [45], [46] (via the Decision Service [47])
to personalize the order of articles shown to each user
so as to maximize clicks, based on 507 features of
user demographics and past browsing history. This is a
challenging scenario due to the large number of features
and low click signal. Contextual bandit algorithms use
randomization to explore different action choices, e.g.,
picking the top article at random. This produces a
dataset that assigns a probability (importance weight) to
each datapoint. The probabilities are used to optimize
models offline and obtain unbiased estimates of their
performance had they been run online [39], [40], [48].
Importance-weighted data have interesting implica-
tions for Pyramid. When updating the count tables with
a given data point, Pyramid must increment the counts
by 1/p, rather than 1, to ensure they remain unbiased.
This weighting also increases the noise required for
differential privacy, because the sensitivity of a single
observation can now be as high as 1/pmin, where pmin
is the minimum probability of any data point.
With these changes, we built a linear model on count-
featurized data and compare it to the (linear) raw-data
model used in production. Both models were trained
using VW’s online contextual bandit learner; in the
production system, a snapshot of the model is deployed
to application servers every five minutes.
Applicability. Our results suggest that in this applica-
tion, selectivity is achieved naturally by retaining only
the last day of data in the hot window and without the
need for Pyramid’s training set minimization. This is
because news is highly non-stationary: new content ap-
pears every hour and breaking news influences people’s
short-term interests. As a result, even without Pyramid,
training models on the last day of raw data is sufficient,
and in fact better than training on more days. This is
in contrast to the MovieLens and Criteo datasets, which
are much more stationary and hence can benefit from
Pyramid’s training set reduction.
That said, even in non-stationary settings, Pyramid
can still enhance data protection through its privacy-
preserving counts. We compared the estimated click-
through rate (CTR) of the count model (with and without
noise) to the raw model across a seven-day period in
April 2016. Fig. 10 shows the results relative to the
default article ranking by editors. Despite day-to-day
variations, on average count models perform within 7%
and 13.5% (with noise) of the raw model performance.
Support for workload evolution. We also assessed
how Pyramid would support changes in MSN over time,
without accessing the raw data store. MSN developers
have spent hundreds (thousands) of human (compute)
hours optimizing the production models. The changes in-
clude: tuning hyperparameters and learning rates, adding
L1/L2 regularization, testing different exploration rates
or model deployment intervals, and adding/interact-
ing/removing features. For example, in some regions
regulatory policies prevent certain user data from being
collected, so they are removed and models are retrained.
Pyramid supports all of the listed changes (§III-C) except
adding new features/feature interactions.
VI. Analysis and Limitations
We analyze Pyramid’s security properties in the con-
text of our threat model (§II-B), pointing out its limi-
tations. A Pyramid deployment has three components:
(1) A central repository of raw data in cold storage that
is infrequently accessed and is assumed to be secure.
Protecting this data store is outside of Pyramid’s scope.
(2) A compute/storage cluster used to train models,
store the plaintext hot window, and to store and update
count tables. (3) Numerous model servers storing trained
models and cached versions of count tables.
We first examine the effects of compromising the clus-
ter responsible for training models, maintaining the hot
window, and storing the count tables. This will reveal the
state of the count tables at time Tattack-∆hot by subtract-
ing all observations residing in the hot window at Tattack.
Property P1 in §II-B captures this exposure. However,
the observations from the range [Tattack-∆retention, Tattack-
∆hot] are protected through differential privacy (property
P2 in §II-B). We expect that the hot window (∆hot)
will be small enough that only a small fraction of an
organization’s data will be exposed. Observations whose
retention period ended before Tattack will have been
erased, and the models will have been retrained to forget
this information (property P3 in §II-B).
In addition to the hot data, the adversary can siphon
observations arriving in the interval [Tattack, T endattack].
Hence, the amount of data exposed depends on the time
to discover and respond to an attack. The sliding nature
of Pyramid’s hot window gives the organization an ad-
vantage when investigating breaches. If an organization
knows Tattack and T
stop
attack, it will be able to determine
exactly which observations were exposed to the attacker
and take the appropriate steps. Knowing these times is
only required for post-attack auditing, not for protection
of past data during the attack.
Under our current threat model, Pyramid does not
protect data from multiple intrusions happening during
the same time window. If an attacker accesses Pyramid’s
internal count tables, that attack is eradicated, and then
gains access again at Tattack2 where Tattack2 follows T
stop
attack,
the attacker will be able to compute the full fidelity
count tables for updates that occurred during the time
range [T stopattack,min(Tattack2, Twin end)] by subtracting the
state of the count table at Tattack from the state of
the same count table at Tattack2. Twin end is the time
when Pyramid finishes populating the count table it was
populating at T stopattack. One approach to mitigate this attack
is to require that Pyramid recomputes count tables after
T stopattack, including reinitializing them with new draws from
the Laplacian distribution. This will require an increased
privacy budget but will still provide a privacy guarantee.
§V demonstrates the need to cache count tables on the
application model servers. Attackers that compromise an
application server will gain access to the existing cached
count table, trained models, and a stream of plaintext
prediction requests (unlabeled observations). With access
only to the application server the adversary will be able
to calculate the difference between the existing count
table and new count tables as they are replicated. The
adversary will learn little because the difference between
the cached count table and the newly replicated count
table will be differentially private.
A key limitation of our system stems from our design
choice to expose data for a period of time, while it is
hot. Data is exposed through the hot data store, trained
models, external predictions, and other states that may
persist after the data is phased out into the differentially
private count tables. There are three implications of
this design choice. First, an adversary may monitor
these states before actually mounting the full-system
break-in that Pyramid is designed to protect against (so
before Tstart). §II-B explicitly leaves this attack out of
scope. Second, exposing the hot data in raw form to
programmers and applications may produce data residues
that persist after the data is phased out, potentially
revealing past information when an attacker breaks in
at Tstart. For example, a programmer may create a local
copy of the hot window at time T for experimentation
purposes. While we cannot ensure that state created out-
of-band is securely managed, the Pyramid design strives
to eliminate any residues for state that Pyramid manages.
This is why we enforce model retraining whenever the
hot window is rolled over. And this is why we clarify in
§III-B2 that the count and weight selection mechanisms
should incorporate differential privacy. Third, while the
exposed hot data may be small (e.g., 1% of all the
data), it may still reveal sufficient sensitive information
to satisfy the attacker’s goal. Despite these caveats, we
believe that our design decision to expose a little hot
data affords important practical benefits that would be
difficult to achieve with a fully protected design. For
example, unlike fully differentially private designs [49],
our scheme allows training of unchanged ML algorithms
with limited impact on their accuracy. Unlike encrypted
databases [50], [51], our scheme provides performance
and scalability close to—or even better than—running
on the raw, fully exposed data.
VII. Related Work
Closest works. Closest to our work are the building
blocks we leverage for Pyramid’s selective data pro-
tection architecture: count featurization and differen-
tial privacy. Count featurization has been developed
and adopted to improve performance and scalability of
certain learning systems. We are the first to retrofit
it to improve data protection, defining the protection
guarantees that can be achieved and implementing them
without sacrificing accuracy.
To implement these guarantees, we leverage differen-
tial privacy theory [52]. The typical threat model for
differentially private systems [28], [49], [53] is different
from ours: they protect user privacy in the results of
a publicly released computation, whereas Pyramid aims
to protect data inside the system, by minimizing access
to historical data so its accesses can be controlled and
monitored more tightly. For example, differential privacy
frameworks (e.g., PINQ [28] and Airavat [53], adding
privacy to LINQ and MapReduce respectively) ensure
that the result of a query will be differentially private.
However, these systems require full and permanent ac-
cess to the data. The same holds for privacy-preserving
recommender systems [49]. Pan-privacy [43], [54], [55]
is a variant of differential privacy that holds even when
an adversary can observe the system’s internal state, a
threat model close to ours.
Pyramid is the first to combine count featurization
with differential privacy for protection.1 This raises sig-
1Azure applies tiny levels of Laplacian noise to count featurization
to avoid overfitting, but such low levels neither provide protection nor
raise the challenges we encountered.
nificant challenges at scale, including rampant noise with
large numbers of count tables and damaging interference
of differential privacy noise with count-min sketches.
To address these challenges, our design includes two
techniques: noise weighting and private count-median
sketches. Prior art, such as iReduct [56] or GUPT [57],
included a noise weighting scheme to allocate less of
the privacy budget to queries with larger results. To our
knowledge, we are the first to point out the limitations
of CMS integration with differential privacy and propose
private count-median sketches as a solution.
Alternative protection approaches. Many alternative
protection models exist. First, many companies enforce
a data retention period. However, because of the data’s
perceived benefit, most companies configure long peri-
ods. Google maintains data for 9-18 months [58]. Pyra-
mid limits the data’s exposure for as long as the company
decides to retain it. Second, some companies anonymize
data: Google erases the last byte of IP addresses in
search logs after 6 months [59]. Anonymization provides
very weak protection [60]. Pyramid leverages differential
privacy to provide rigorous protection guarantees. Third,
some companies enforce access controls on the data.
Google’s Sawmill strips out sensitive data before return-
ing results to processes lacking certain permissions [61].
Given the push toward increased developer access to
data [5], [6], Pyramid provides additional benefit by
protecting data on a needs basis.
Data minimization. Compact data representation is an
important topic in big data systems, and many techniques
exist for different scenarios. Sketching techniques com-
pute compact representations of the data that support
queries of summary statistics [26], large-scale regres-
sion analysis [62], privacy preserving aggregation [63];
streaming/online algorithms [64], [65] process the data
using bounded memory, retaining only the information
relevant for the problem at hand; dimensionality reduc-
tion techniques [10] find a low-dimensional, faithful rep-
resentation of the raw data, according to different mea-
sures of faithfulness; hash featurization [11] compacts
high-cardinality categorical variables; coresets [66], [67]
are data subsets giving a good approximation for a
given computation; autoencoders attempt to learn a
compressed identity function [68].
We believe that this rich literature should be inspected
for candidates for selective data protection. Not all
mechanisms will be suitable. For example, according
to our evaluation (Fig. 4), hash featurization [11] does
not yield sufficient training set reduction. And none of
the mechanisms listed above appear to support workload
evolution. The next section presents a few promising
techniques we have identified.
VIII. Closing: A Vision for Selectivity
We close with our vision for selectivity in big data
systems. Today’s indiscriminate data collection, long-
term archival, and wide-access practices are risky and
unsustainable. It is time for a more rigorous and selective
approach to big data collection, access, and protection so
that its benefits can be reaped without undue risks.
Hot
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minimize in size,
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protect 
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avoid 
access
Our vision (illustrated on
the right) involves architect-
ing data-driven systems to
permit clean separation of
data needed by current and
evolving workloads, from
data collected and archived for possible future needs. The
former should be minimized in size and time span (hence
the pyramid shape). The latter should be protected vigor-
ously and only tapped under exceptional circumstances.
These requirements should be met without disrupting
functional properties of the workloads.
The notion of selectivity applies to many big data
workloads, including ML and non-ML, and there are per-
haps multiple ways to conceptualize the data selectivity
problem. For ML workloads, we find that a productive
way of identifying potential mechanisms is to model the
problem as a training set minimization problem. This
reveals a rich set of mechanisms that might be leveraged
to achieve data selectivity. We have identified several
promising mechanisms, which we hope to incorporate
into Pyramid for wider workload coverage:
• Vector quantization (VQ). VQ [12] is a family of tech-
niques used to compactly represent high dimensional,
real-valued feature vectors. At a high level, VQ computes
a small subset of vectors, known as the codebook or the
centroids, that are representative of the entire set of input
vectors (e.g., historical data).
• Sampling. Uniform random sampling and more ad-
vanced techniques like herding [69] can be used to
maintain a representative sample of the historical data.
This sample can be combined with in-use data to form a
training set. Compared to VQ, which often makes certain
assumptions about the underlying data (e.g., that it forms
clusters), sampling techniques are more general.
• Active learning. Active learning algorithms [15] tell
users what specific data points they need for improved
accuracy. Originally built to decrease manual labeling,
they may be valuable to selective data collection.
We leave investigation of such mechanisms for future
work. The key challenge will be to identify the kinds of
protection and privacy guarantees achievable with these
mechanisms, and how to effectively implement them.
This paper provides a first blueprint for this process.
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Appendix
A. Differentially Private Weight and Count Selection
As noted in §III-B2, the weighted noise infusion
and count selection processes must be made differ-
entially private. While our IEEE Security & Privacy
paper [30] did not address this problem, we have
since modified Pyramid to compute feature weights in
a differentially private way. We also have a design
for private count selection. Our method is based on
several known techniques from the differentially privacy
literature (overviewed in §A1), which we adapt to our
specific problem. This section describes and evaluates
our mechanism for private weight computation (§A2)
and describes how one might apply the same mechanism
to make count selection private (§A3).
A.1. Background: Smooth Sensitivity
Smooth sensitivity [31] is a technique used to fine-
tune the amount of differential privacy noise to the
sensitivity of a computation on a specific dataset, instead
of the worst case sensitivity, which in many cases can
be disastrous. Smooth sensitivity is based on the insight
that for some statistics the worst case sensitivity is very
large (e.g. the whole range of the data for the median),
but on most datasets changing a single data point barely
changes the result, resulting in a small local sensitivity.
One can add noise based on the smooth sensitivity, an
upper bound of the local sensitivity that prevents the
local sensitivity to leak any information on the dataset.
For some functions f , computing the smooth sensi-
tivity with a closed formula is not practical, or even
not possible. In such cases, and assuming f can be
approximated well on subsets of the data, it is possible to
leverage the sample-and-aggregate framework [31]. One
splits the full database into n groups (as in [70]) and
applies function f to each of the groups. The results are
then aggregated using a function with a known smooth
sensitivity, such as the median or the center-of-attention,
and adds noise to the output of the aggregation function.
Since each data point can change at most one of the
groups, the final result is differentially private.
A.2. Private Weighted Noise Infusion
We refine the weighted noise infusion process de-
scribed §III-B2) to make it differentially private using
smooth sensitivity. The quantile function indeed has a
poor global sensitivity but on most datasets, including
those we tried, has a very small local sensitivity. We
adapt the J-List algorithm for median smooth sensitiv-
ity [31], modified in a straight forward way for arbi-
trary quantiles, to compute the smooth sensitivity of the
quantile function for each feature over one observation
window. The maximum value of each count is the size of
the window, and we use a Cauchy distribution to preserve
()-differential privacy.
We evaluate our private weighted noise infusion pro-
cess with the same datasets and a similar experimental
setup as in our evaluation (§V-A). For simplicity, for
each dataset, we set aside a window to be only for
weight calculation and are not reused for training later.
We choose a window size of 1M points, small compared
to the size of the datasets (2.5% of the dataset for
Criteo, and 4.5% for Movielens – although results a
identical with 200k windows, less than 1% of the data,
on the Movielens dataset) but large enough to get reliable
differentially private estimates. We compute the 10th
percentile of the counts as it is less sensitive than the
1st one, and then rescale the weights to be between
1 and 10k, the maximum number used in the non
private weights computation (§V). We compute the noise
weights on the first window using the entire privacy
budget, and then use the results to initialize the count
tables for training on the rest of the training set. We use
the same  value for both weight calculation and training.
Fig. 11 shows our results. For both datasets, the private
weighted noise infusion preserves the performance gains
we observed for the non-private weighted noise infusion.
On the Criteo dataset, we observe the same improvement
as with non private noise weighting, about 0.5 percentage
points. On the Movielens data, the results are even better,
which we assume is due to the larger window used
to compute the weights. We see that with  = 1 the
weighting scheme allows the boosted trees to get within
5% of the baseline. The improvements for  = 0.33 and
 = 0.1 are even larger, with  = 0.33 close to the 5%
bar.
A.3. Private Count Selection
Like the initial design for weighted noise infusion,
our current group selection mechanism is not differen-
tially private and will leak information about the data
used in performing count selection. While we have
not done so yet, we think that a good approach to
make differentially private count selection is to leverage
the sample-aggregate framework from [31], with the
center of attention aggregation. The center of attention
can aggregate functions with multi-dimensional outputs.
This means we can compute our conditional mutual
information metrics for each group we are interested in,
and add noise proportional to the smooth sensitivity of an
aggregation on the entire vector. We can then chose the
groups with the higher results as before, thus preserving
privacy.
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Fig. 11: Private Weighted Noise Infusion Results are normalized to the respective baselines. Weights were calculated on a 200K observation
window for MovieLens and a 1M observation MovieLens for Criteo-Kaggle. Pyramid can provide privacy to the observations used to calculate
the hot window while still effectively distributing the privacy budget across features.
A.4. Extension
A promising extension for our private weight infusion
mechanism would be to refine the count estimates over
multiple hot windows, yielding a double improvement:
(1) counts are more accurate, as they benefit from the
previous weighting, and (2) previous weights can also be
used to compute the new ones more accurately. When
weight estimates are computed on multiple windows, all
the information can still be used to get more precise
estimates. As explained in [71], the lowest-variance,
unbiased estimate of the weights from multiple compu-
tations is w =
∑n
i=1
wi
λ2i
/
∑n
i=1
1
λ2i
, with wi the weight
computed on window i with noise scale λi. For instance,
one could choose to assign half the privacy budget of n
consecutive windows to computing the weights. Counts
are computed without weighting on the first window.
For each of the following n − 1 windows, weights are
computed using the previous’ window counts, and half
the current privacy budget. These new values are merged
with any previous estimate as we just described. The
counts for this window are then computed with the
other half of the privacy budget and the new weights.
This process can be repeated regularly, every month
for example, to update the weights to changes in the
distribution.
B. Avenue for Deployment: Pyramid As-A-
Featurization-Service
We discuss a possible approach to deployment in a
production setting. As described in this paper, Pyramid
requires substantial changes to a company’s data pipeline
and proposes replacing the past with summary statistics.
The accuracy loss, while reasonable, may be unaccept-
able to some. Still, we believe that there are avenues
for Pyramid’s immediate adoption in production. One of
those, which we are presently investigating, is to provide
Pyramid’s differentially private count featurization as a
service.
Count features or marginals are commonly used in
addition to raw features to improve the performance
of machine learning models that are trained on full
datasets. As demonstrated in §V-E, it is critical for such
applications to collocate the count tables with the pre-
dictive models. However, widely distributing the count
tables to model servers increases their exposure. We
argue that using Pyramid’s approach in such applications
would already produce a large benefit in reduced data
exposure (for instance in the case of a compromised
model server), and we believe the accuracy cost would be
small enough to be bearable. This way, an organization
does not need to replace the entire data management
system to benefit from some techniques leveraged by
Pyramid when deploying count featurization.
To retrofit Pyramid to this use case, we advocate
building a count featurization service. This service would
plug in the data injection pipeline, and process all
incoming data to build the differentially private count
tables. The count tables would use the count-median
sketch for high cardinality features, and could support
(, δ)-differential privacy and advanced composition to
support more features without too much impact. It would
divide the data stream in windows of a parametrized size
or time, and support retention policies. Noise weights
could automatically be computed and refined over time,
as described in §A2. Automatic feature groups could be
supported if made differentially private. The featurization
service would provide a client library that can be called
to add the count features to datapoints before they
are used for training or prediction. This library would
be responsible for caching the count tables, allow low
latency featurization necessary in many settings.
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